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INTRODUCTION

The Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order are interlocutory orders,
which are generally made ex parte and before proceedings have been
commenced, but they also may be issued at any stage of the proceedings and
in aid of execution. The Mareva injunction basically imposes a temporary
'freezing' order against the assets of a defendant or potential defendant, which
may later be required to satisfy a judgment in the plaintiff's favor. The
purpose of the Mareva injunction is to prevent the defendant from dissipating
or disposing of assets by removing them from or within the jurisdiction in a
manner that would frustrate a potential judgment. Similarly, the Anton Piller
order is an extraordinary form of presuit or prejudgment discovery that
allows the plaintiff to search the defendant's premises and seize items or
documents that might become evidence in any later action brought by the
plaintiff against the defendant. Such a search may only be made by solicitors
appointed by the court, and typically the judge will permit the plaintiff's
solicitors to engage in the search, supervised in some instances by an
independent solicitor experienced in the application of Anton Pillerorders. 1
The purpose behind the Anton Piller order is to prevent a defendant from
destroying evidence or documents before a writ is issued or before trial.2
Although the Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order are ancillary to
the main action, they are extraordinary remedies and often have a decisive
effect on a case. Indeed, the title of this article borrows a phrase from Lord
Justice John Donaldson, who stated in Bank Mellat v. Nikpour that the
Mareva injunction "is in effect, together with the Anton Piller order, one of
the law's two 'nuclear' weapons." 3 For the plaintiff seeking swift justice or
security in anticipation of obtaining a future judgment, the Mareva injunction
and Anton Pillerorder offer effective preliminary remedies against defendants
based in the United Kingdom or abroad with assets located in the United
Kingdom or foreign jurisdictions. The swift nature in which these remedies
may be obtained accounts for their frequent use amongst commercial
litigation practitioners in England and Wales, especially in cases involving
defendants with transnational business operations and property located in

1. Universal Thermosensors Ltd. v. Hibben, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 840, 860-61 (Ch.)
(discussing procedures that should be followed when carrying out an Anton Piller order).
2. Id. at 842, 859.
3. [1985] F.S.R. 87, 92 (C.A.).
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several jurisdictions.
Part II of this article describes the background and the context in which
Mareva and Anton Piller orders were developed by English courts. Part III
discusses the considerations and procedural requirements for obtaining a
Mareva injunction. Part IV analyzes the use of Anton Piller orders and
discusses some of the procedural, tactical, and legal issues involved in their
execution. Part V analyzes both orders together and explains how they have
become popular tactics for pre-writ and prejudgment relief for plaintiffs
seeking to enforce various remedies in English civil litigation. Part VI
discusses the Mareva injunction and its application to European Community
members under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act. Finally, Part VII
compares the use of Mareva and Anton Piller orders with similar U.S.
procedural devices that enable claimants or creditors to act swiftly in
protecting their interests.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAREVA INJUNCTION AND
THE ANTON PILLER ORDER

The globalization of the world economy not only has brought increased
wealth and economic opportunity to many, but also has resulted in more
complexity and anonymity in international business transactions, which
coupled with increased competitive pressures, has increased the willingness
of many parties to breach contracts and leave debts unpaid. The growing
potential for profits to be made in carefully constructed international deals
has presented more opportunities for contracts to be broken. Further, the
increasing sophistication of technology in the global economy has made it
possible for financial assets and other resources to be transferred between
jurisdictions in a very short time. As international trade increases throughout
the global economy, there will be an increasing number of judgment debtors
trying to evade their debts since a judgment, per se, will have little effect
against a debtor who can easily transfer assets and operations to other
jurisdictions.
On the international level, there is little protection for a party seeking to
secure a claim against a debtor who has breached its obligations and poses
a serious risk of transfer or dissipation of assets. The English courts have
responded to the increased risks posed by globalization and improved
technology by crafting judicial remedies that allow parties to act with speed
and secrecy in protecting their interests in assets that would otherwise be
disposed of or dissipated. These extraordinary remedies have significantly
increased the attractiveness of English law as the choice of law for many
international traders who seek security and stability of expectations in
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conducting international transactions.4
The single most effective argument for granting a Mareva injunction is
to prevent a defendant from escaping its obligations by disposing or
transferring assets from the jurisdiction with the intent of preventing plaintiff
from executing an eventual judgment against assets. As will be discussed
later, applicants for a Mareva injunction, whether a plaintiff or
counterclaiming defendant, have to make a "'good arguable case' . . . that
the refusal of a[n] ... injunction would involve a real risk that a[n eventual]
judgment or [arbitral] award in favor of the [applicant] would remain
unsatisfied."5 Similarly, an Anton Piller order allows a plaintiff, or a
counterclaiming defendant, to serve an order on a party that authorizes entry
onto premises controlled by the party in order to search and seize certain
documents and other evidence that may be used later in a lawsuit or trial.6
To maintain the element of surprise, speed and secrecy are required in
applying for both a Mareva and an Anton Piller order.7 An ex parte order
is therefore necessary otherwise the defendant will have notice of the action
and the opportunity to dissipate assets if not restrained.8 After the ex parte
order has been issued, subsequent applications by either party generally will
be made inter partes if at all possible. 9 It should be emphasized, however,
that an application to discharge a Mareva or Anton Piller order is relatively
rare, which suggests that these orders are successful tools in convincing
defendants to settle.
Although English courts have only allowed Mareva and Anton Piller
orders to be used since the 1970s, their effectiveness has led to their
increasing use and popularity among commercial litigators, thereby
strengthening the appeal of English courts as forums to resolve international
commercial disputes. The use of these orders provides effective prejudgment
relief for plaintiffs seeking to preserve financial assets and other property to
which they can later attach judgments. Accordingly, many global companies
and traders prefer English law as the choice of law and especially English

4. See George C.J. Moore, Choice of Law and Forum: Swift Justice in England,
Including Pre-Judgment Tactics and Relief and Enforcement ThroughoutEurope, Presentation

at the ABA, International Law Section, 6-9 (Apr. 29, 1998 NYC) (on file with the author)
(arguing why English law is the preferred choice of law in international transactions).
5. Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH und Co., [1983] 1
W.L.R. 1412, 1422 (C.A.).
6. Anton Piller K.G. v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] 1 Ch. 55, 62 (C.A. 1975).
The order's name is derived from the case. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 101.
7. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 669 (C.A.)
(speed); Universal Thermosensors, [1992] 1 W.L.R. at 860 (secrecy).
8. Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 1423.

9.
1997).

MARK

S.W.

HOYLE,THE MAREVA INJUNCTIONS AND RELATED ORDERS
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courts as the preferred forum for resolving international commercial
disputes. 10
The Mareva injunction and Anton Piller orders are relatively recent
phenomena in English civil litigation. Before 1975, it had not been the
practice of the English courts to grant an injunction in circumstances where
an order was sought to restrain a defendant from disposing of its property on
the grounds of a likely recovery by a plaintiff in a civil action." This
changed in 1975 when the English Court of Appeal overruled a High Court
judge and issued an interlocutory order in favor of the appellants, Japanese
shipowners, who had leased their ships to Greek charterers who failed to pay
certain sums for the use of the ships. 12 In Nippon Yusen Kaisha v.
3
plaintiffs issued a writ against the charterers for the amount
Karageorgis,1
past due, and when they became convinced that the charterers would take
steps to remove their funds from the jurisdiction of English courts, they
applied ex parte to the High Court for an interim injunction restraining the
defendants from transferring their assets outside of English jurisdiction. 4
The circumstances of the case were such that it was evident that the money
was owing, and there was little question of an arguable defense, so summary
judgment was likely. 5 The purpose behind this application therefore was
to ensure that some funds would remain available, against which execution
of a likely judgment could be obtained by plaintiffs.' 6
At the time, there was no case law supporting plaintiff's application for
such an emergency injunction, and in keeping with established practice, Lord7
Justice Donaldson in the High Court denied the shipowner's application.'
No previous plaintiff had ever appealed such a denial, most probably because
many practitioners considered a reversal of the rigid rule to be unlikely in the
absence of statutory intervention. However, plaintiffs filed an immediate
appeal, which came before the Court of Appeal for judgment on May 22,
1975.18 The appeal was granted, and an injunction was ordered restraining
the defendant charterers from disposing of their assets in England or outside
the jurisdiction.' 9 As authority, the Court of Appeal relied on section 45(1)
of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, which
provides: "The High Court may grant a mandamus or an injunction or

10. Moore, supra note 4, at 2.
11. Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageoris, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, 1094 (C.A.).
12. Id. at 1094.
13. Id. at 1093.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1095.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 1094.
18. Id. at 1093.
19. Id. at 1095.
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appoint a receiver by an interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears
to the court to be just or convenient to do so."" ° Lord Denning expressed
the view that if no restraint were imposed, the funds would be sent overseas
and would be difficult to recover and stated that "[t]here [wa]s a strong prima
21
facie case that the hire [wa]s owing and unpaid.",
Nearly a month later, before commercial practitioners had had sufficient
time to adjust to this groundbreaking ruling, the same issue was considered
again by the Court of Appeal in the case Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v.
InternationalBulkcarriers S.A., which gave its name to this particular type
of order. Mareva involved shipowners who had leased their vessel, the
Mareva, on a time charter to charterers who in turn subchartered the ship to
the Indian government.2 3 The voyage charter was to deliver fertilizer to
India in return for payment which was scheduled to be made in London.24
After making two installment payments, the charterers defaulted on the third
payment to the shipowners, even though they had received full payment by
the Indian High Commission.25 The Indian government's payment was on
deposit in a London account, and plaintiffs made an ex parte application on
June 20, 1975 to freeze the proceeds as part of their claim for the amount
due of US$30,800 plus damages.26
As in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha case, the shipowners feared that the
charterers would dispose of their funds before execution of the judgment, and
an application was made ex parte for an injunction restraining defendants.
Again Justice Donaldson had reviewed the application and granted it
temporarily until June 23, 1975 in deference to the Court of Appeal's recent
decision in Nippon Yusen Kaisha and to give the plaintiffs time to appeal.28
But he refused to grant an extension based on the grounds that he had no
jurisdiction to make such an order.29 Plaintiffs made an ex parte appeal,
and Lord Denning again stated his view unequivocally, relying on section 45
of the Supreme Judicature Act of 1925 for authority. 30 He stated: "If it
appears that [a] debt is due and owing, and there is a danger that the debtor
may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment, the court has
jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to
20. Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49,
§ 45(1).
21. Id.

22. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A.).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 214.

26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id.
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prevent [the debtor] disposing of those assets."'"
These two cases provided a radical change in the direction of English
civil litigation, the principles of which would be applied in a wide range of
actions with the intent of preventing defendants from making themselves
judgment-proof.32 Accordingly, a new practice has developed in English
commercial litigation which has become undoubtedly one of the most useful
to a party faced with an opponent who is likely to arrange its affairs in a
manner that would frustrate a court judgment or arbitral award.
Following Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Mareva, and other cases, the British
Parliament codified the Mareva injunction in section 37 of the Supreme
Court Act 1981 and extended its scope to be used in respect of any dispute
that is to be referred to or is in the course of domestic arbitration.3 3 Later,
in 1990, the English Court of Appeal upheld the use of the Mareva
injunction and Anton Piller order on an international or worldwide basis so
that a defendant's assets might be attached in a foreign jurisdiction and
possible evidence might be examined with permission of the foreign
government.34
Since the late 1970s, the grant of Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller
orders have become relatively common. Both remedies are popular pretrial
tactics for plaintiffs seeking to preserve financial assets and other property
in order to satisfy an eventual judgment and to preserve evidence that would
buttress the plaintiff's claim at trial. Indeed, by 1986, as Justice Bingham
acknowledged in Siporex Trade S.A. v. Comdel Commodities Ltd. 35 the use
of the Mareva injunction and other ex parte orders had become quite
common, as hundreds of orders were being made each year with few
36
applications being rejected.

III.

THE MAREVA INJUNCTION: BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

The English court's authority to issue a Mareva injunction derives from
its inherent power to grant an injunction in support of only a legal or
equitable right within the jurisdiction of the English courts. 37 This essential
twin test means that a Mareva injunction is completely ancillary to a claim,
regardless of the fact that, in practice, it is the Mareva injunction and not the
writ that often ends the dispute between the parties because of its draconian

31.

32.
33.
34.
Haiti v.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 215.

Id. at 214.
Supreme Court Act 1981 § 37(3) (Eng.).
Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1), [1990] Ch. 48, 57-58 (C.A. 1988); Republic of
Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. 202, 215-217 (C.A. 1988).
[1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 428 (Q.B.).
Id.
Mareva, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 214.
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effect. The ancillary nature of the Mareva injunction was demonstrated in
Veracruz Transportation v. VC. Shipping Co. 38 where the Court of Appeal
stated that the principle to be drawn from Siskina v. Distos Compania
Naviera S.A. was that the right to obtain an interlocutory injunction, such as
a Mareva, "cannot stand on its own" because it is not a cause of action per
se and therefore must be based on a legal or equitable right of the applicant
over which the English courts have jurisdiction. 39 The party seeking a
Mareva injunction therefore must not confuse the issues surrounding its
operation with the issue of whether there is a legal right, within the
jurisdiction of the English courts, that can be assisted by the Mareva or other
interlocutory injunction.
A.

Procedure

A Mareva injunction is sought because the plaintiff fears the consequences of not restraining a rogue defendant from disposing of or dissipating
assets. 40 Although most Mareva applications used to be in the Commercial
Court, they are now made in all divisions and sub-divisions of the High
Court. The application may be made in the Chancery, Queen's Bench, or
Commercial Divisions of the High Court. 1 It is suggested that applicant
make an ex parte application because if notice is provided for an inter partes
hearing, the defendant will have sufficient notice to remove assets or to
destroy evidence.
In the Queen's Bench Division, the applicant should prepare a writ which
contains the following documents: (1) a statement of claim, (2) an affidavit
in support, and (3) two copies of the draft of the order that the plaintiff

38. [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 353 (C.A. 1991); see also Zucker v. Tyndall Holdings plc,
[1992] 1 W.L.R. 1127, 1136 (C.A.) (holding that "a Mareva injunction can only be granted

by the English court in support of a cause of action which the English court has jurisdiction
to entertain").
39. Id. at 357 (quoting Siskina, [1979] A.C. 210, 256 (1977)). The Siskina court stated:
It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant
arising out of an invasion, actual or threatened by him, of a legal or equitable right
of the plaintiff for the enforcement of which the defendant is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court. The right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely
ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action.
Siskina, [1979] A.C. at 256. The decision would now be different because of the 1968
Brussels Convention and the British Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982, but the
principles remain valid. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 229.
41. Practice Direction (Interlocutory Injunction: Forms), [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1551 (High
Court of Justice) [hereinafter 1996 Practice Direction]; ANTHONY D. COLMAN & VICTOR
LYON, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT 97 (4th ed. 1995).
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requests the court to issue.42 These papers should ordinarily be filed in
chambers with the clerk to the Judge at the Royal Courts of Justice in
London by 3 p.m. on the day before the application is to be heard.43 The
ex parte application is made in chambers."a In the case of a "worldwide
Mareva," it is strongly suggested that the applicant submit the filing four to
five days before the scheduled presentation in chambers to allow the judge
sufficient time to consider the impact, if any, of the order on the law of the
foreign jurisdiction.45 In the Chancery Division, the applicants follow a
similar procedure with the exception that the court often directs that
arguments in support of the order be made in a public motions hearing
though sometimes applications are permitted to be heard in Chambers.4 6
In the Commercial Court, an applicant must submit the writ or draft
before the court, together with an affidavit (in draft form in an emergency),
that "sets out the nature of the amount of the claim, and fairly states the
47
points [if any] made against it by the [actual or proposed] defendant.
The addition of a statement or points of claim is helpful because it outlines
in proper pleadings the plaintiff's case, even if it is a draft.48 If necessary,
counsel should remind his solicitor to ensure that the undertakings, which in
practical terms are for the solicitor to carry out, are completed. Unless stated
otherwise, all undertakings given to the court by plaintiff are his personally, 49 even if it is anticipated that the solicitor will carry them out on
plaintiff's behalf.50 If there is a breach, liability, costs, and legal fees will
be imposed on plaintiff;5' however, in some instances where the actions of

the plaintiff's solicitor have been especially egregious, the solicitor may incur
liability.
For all divisions, the affidavit in support must also show that it is
reasonable to believe that the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction, and
that there is a real risk that the defendant will insulate itself from judgment
by deliberately dealing the assets unless restrained. 52 Moreover, full and

42. Practice Direction (Judge in Chambers: Procedure), [1983] 1 W.L.R. 433, 434 (Q.B.)
[hereinafter 1983 Practice Direction]; COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 98. This draft
order is known as a "draft minute of order." 1983 Practice Direction, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at
434.
43. 1983 Practice Direction, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 434.
44. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 97.

45. ALG Inc. v. Uganda Airlines Corp., (1992) Times Weekly Reporter (Q.B. Div.)
(transcript July 31).
46. HOYLE, supra note 9, at 29.
47. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 98.
48. See 1996 Practice Direction, [1996] 1 W.L.R. at 1551.
49. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 98.
50. HOYLE, supra note 9, at 63.
51. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 98.

52. Id.
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frank disclosure of all material matters must be made; for in fact, the plaintiff
should include more information than is necessary to avoid omissions that
could lead to the judge rejecting the application.53 The affidavit can be
sworn by an individual plaintiff, a senior officer or director of a plaintiff
corporation, or the plaintiff's solicitor in control of the action.
A draft order, usually drafted by counsel and based on the standard
forms, must include all the terms of the injunction applied for, together with
the undertakings, and should be attached to the writ and affidavit, which are
generally delivered to the court before the hearing. 54 Oral arguments based
on the submitted documents can then take place, and if the judge approves
the application, he will initial the draft order, which will include any
amendments, and it will become immediately operative.55 At that point,
plaintiff may provide notice to defendant and to third parties in control of
assets, by telephone if necessary, and the written order will be sent to an
agent for service of process. The notice should contain a penal notice
warning of the consequences of a breach of the injunction.5 6 The award of
costs on a ex parte application are usually reserved for a later hearing.
A Mareva injunction must contain a provision authorizing a defendant
within the jurisdiction to draw a certain amount of money as reasonable
living expenses to avoid undue hardship and granting the defendant
permission to make subsequent applications to the court to change the order
Moreover, a Mareva
only to adjust the amount for living expenses.
assets that is to be
specific
amount
of
the
defendant's
injunction may state a
frozen, or it may simply be a general order covering all the defendant's
assets. 58 Either party may apply later to have this amount altered or
discharged.5 9 The purpose of a specific maximum amount is to permit the
defendant to have use of the balance of the assets; but the application of a
maximum amount to third parties who have no knowledge of what other
assets are held by or for the defendant can cause problems, because of the
danger that any release of funds or assets in the belief that other assets are
frozen will possibly be in breach of the order. The solution is for an order
for discovery to be made as part of the Mareva application in order to

53. Negocios del Mar S.A. v. Doric Shipping Corp. S.A., [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 337
(C.A. 1978).
54. See HOYLE, supra note 9, at 61-67, app. 4 at 183-201 & n.1 (based on the precedent
contained in PracticeDirection (Mareva Injunctions and Anton PillerOrders: Forms), [1996]
1 WLR 1552).
55. Id. at 29. The courts now request submission of a disk with the draft order. 1996
PracticeDirection, [1996] 1 W.L.R. at 1551 4.
56. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 127-28.
57. Id. at 125.
58. Id.
59. Moore, supra note 4, at 19.
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identify and determine exactly the defendant's assets, so that assets above the
claim can be released. Plaintiff's counsel should calculate that the maximum
amount to be frozen to cover not only the amount claimed, but also costs,
legal fees, interest, and the likely damages and costs incurred for third
parties, such as banks or custodians of property.
Although the order freezes the assets until a fixed date, variations to this
practice occur regularly as the circumstances of a case may demand. Most
judges will rarely accept an order freezing assets "until judgment or later
execution". 6° The usual course is to apply for an extension of the Mareva
after judgment, even in cases involving default judgment if the writ includes
a claim for an injunction. 6' The most recent amendment to the procedures
governing Mareva and other interlocutory applications became effective in
1995 and is found in Order 29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC).6 2
It provides:
An application for the grant of an injunction may be
(1)
made by any party to a cause or matter before or after the trial of the
cause or matter, whether or not a claim for the injunction was
included in that party's writ, originating summons, counterclaim or
third party notice, as the case may be.
Where the case is one of urgency such application may
(2)
be made ex parte on affidavit but, except as aforesaid, such
application must be made by motion or summons.
The plaintiff may not make such an application before
(3)
the issue of the writ or originating summons by which the cause or
matter is to be begun except where the case is one of urgency, and
in that case the injunction applied for may be granted on terms
or summons and such other terms,
providing for the issue of the writ
63
if any, as the Court thinks fit.
The amended Order 29 codifies, in a procedural sense, the court's authority
to issue such emergency ex parte orders based on both section 37 of the
Supreme Court Act 1981 and Mareva case law. 64

60. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 126.
61. Stewart Chartering Ltd. v. C & 0 Managements S.A., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 460, 460-61
(Q.B. 1979) (citing R.S.C., Ord. 13, r. 16).
62. HOYLE, supra note 9, at 29 & n.3.
63. Id. (quoting R.S.C., Ord. 29, rule 1).
64. Id.
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Legal Costs

A party that obtains a Mareva or Anton Pillerorder is entitled to recover
legal fees and costs by filing a motion with the court with an attached
affidavit of attorneys' fees and costs. The hearing to determine legal costs
almost invariably occurs at a later date, or after trial if there is no settlement.
A successful party may be deprived of its legal fees and costs if it can be
shown, for example, that the party knew the defendants were likely to be
prepared to remedy the matters on which the complaint was made.65
Moreover, there are rare situations when the court, even though it initially
approved a plaintiff's ex parte application, will later decide that the plaintiff
must pay not only its own legal costs, but also the legal costs or damages of
defendant if it later turns out that the Mareva was without foundation. The
usual consequence where a plaintiff was legally justified in applying for an
injunction but arguably should not have done so, given the facts of the case,
is that the plaintiff who so acted precipitatively loses its own legal costs.
Moreover, a solicitor can be ordered to pay his client for wasted costs, so as
to indemnify the client against a costs order in favor of the other side, if the
solicitor incurred the costs as a result of seeking a hasty injunction when
other alternatives would have been more appropriate. 66 In awarding costs,
the courts are increasingly looking to the time immediately prior to the
application for the injunction to see whether or not there was scope for a
reasonable compromise, or whether one side acted too quickly.
C.

Scope

The assets to which the injunction attaches may be tangible or intangible,
realty or personalty. 67 In addition to bank accounts and choses in action,
they include chattels such as motor vehicles, jewelry, objets d'art and other
valuables.68 Where money is held in a bank account in foreign currency,
the bank may convert sufficient sums into the currency stated in the order to
meet the requirements of the order.69 Unless the plaintiff seeks a worldwide
Mareva, there must be some grounds for showing that the defendant has

65. Bluebell, Inc. v. Farmer Int'l Ltd., (1980) 130 N.L.J. 303, 318 (C.A.).
66. See generally R.S.C., Ord. 62, r. 11. Because this rule has been cited for different
orders in different cases, reference should be made to the Supreme Court Practice and
Supplements.

67. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 107.
68. C.B.S. United Kingdom Ltd. v. Lambert, [1983] Ch. 37 (C.A); HOYLE, supra note 9,
at 33-34.
69. Z. Ltd. v. A-Z & AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 593 (C.A. 1981). The conversion may
be made at the bank's current rate of exchange. The converted sum should then be held
subject to the order. Id.
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assets within the jurisdiction.7" The Mareva will apply to assets that are
acquired after the injunction has been granted, but before the eventual
execution of any judgment obtained in the action.71
1. Worldwide Mareva
In most cases involving Mareva orders, the assets that are the subject of
the order are not those at issue in the underlying cause of action, but are
assets out of which the plaintiffs will seek to recoup the judgment debt if
they obtain judgment. It was therefore considered for a longtime that the
Mareva injunction, originally based on a blend of judicial discretion, inherent
jurisdiction, and statute, could not affect property abroad except in limited
instances, even if the form of the order was to bind the defendant, rather than
the property. 72 Until 1988, the English courts generally refused to make
orders concerning assets outside of the jurisdiction except in those limited
cases where, on the basis of statute or the Rules of the Supreme Court, they
felt authorized to do SO. 73 This all changed in the summer of 1988 when
the English Court of Appeal decided three cases within weeks of each other
in which the court extended the Mareva jurisdiction to include orders
regulating the behavior of parties in foreign jurisdictions. This "Worldwide
Mareva" was established in Babanaft International Co. S.A. v. Bassatne,74
75
Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, and Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1).76
In these cases, the English courts were authorized in certain circumstances
to grant an order against a defendant otherwise within its jurisdiction relating
to assets held by the defendant overseas.77

In deciding whether to apply for a worldwide Mareva, however, counsel
should consider the substantial costs involved. In each of the three cases
above, the claims were worth more than £10 million.7 8 In each case, the

70. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 668 (C.A.).
71. T.D.K. Tape Distributor (U.K.) Ltd. v. Videochoice Ltd., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 141, 145
(Q.B. 1985).
72. Ashtiani v. Kashi, [1986] 2 All E.R. 970, 977 (C.A.).
73. Interpool Ltd. v. Galani, [1988] 1 Q.B. 738, 741-42 (C.A.); see also Maclaine Watson
& Co. Ltd. v. International Tin Council, [1988] 1 Ch. 1, 17-20 (C.A. 1987). These cases
involve judgment creditors relying on R.S.C. Order 48 1(1) using post-judgment discovery
orders to make inquiries concerning a judgment debtor's assets outside of the jurisdiction.
Interpool, [1988] 1 Q.B. at 740-41; Maclaine Watson, [1988] 1 Ch. at 17-20.
74. [1990] 1 Ch. 13 (C.A. 1988). See generally RICHARD M. OUGH & WILLIAM
FLENLEY, MAREVA INJUNCTIONS AND ANTON PILLER ORDERS (2d. ed. 1993).
75. [1990] 1 Q.B. 202 (C.A. 1988).
76. [1990] 1 Ch. 48 (C.A. 1988).
77. Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. at 215; Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 32; Derby No. 1, [1990]
1 Ch. at 57.
78. Duvalier,[1990] 1 Q.B. at 204; Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 15-16; Derby No. 1, [1990]
1 Ch. at 51.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

13

FLORIDA
JOURNAL Law,
OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Florida Journal
of International
Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1997],
Art. 8

[Vol. I11

court emphasized that, although it had jurisdiction to grant the requested
order, the granting of such orders should only occur in extraordinary
circumstances. 7 9 The application for the order in England, and the steps
necessary to attempt enforcement abroad, will be expensive, and should be
considered only in exceptional cases where large sums are at stake and the
risk of incurring substantial costs is justified.
In all three cases, it was acknowledged that English courts may not grant
a Mareva injunction over foreign assets in precisely the same manner as they
would over assets within England and Wales. ° Where foreign assets are
involved, the court will insert a proviso within the order, known as the
Babanaft proviso. 81 Since the actual Babanaft case, the proviso has been
modified by subsequent rulings.82 Today, courts accept the version that was
stated by Lord Donaldson in Derby & Co Ltd v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4):
Provided that, in so far as this order purports to have any extraterritorial effect, no person shall be affected thereby or concerned with
the terms thereof until it shall be declared enforceable or be enforced
by a foreign court and then it shall only affect them to the extent of
such declaration or enforcement unless they are: (a) a person to
whom this order is addressed or an officer of or an agent appointed
by a power of attorney of such a person or (b) persons who are
subject to the jurisdiction of this court and (i) have been given
written notice of this order at their residence or place of business
within the jurisdiction, and (ii) are able to prevent acts or omissions
outside the jurisdiction
of this court which assist in the breach of the
83
terms of the order.
The parties affected by the proviso are generally classified in three
groups: (1) the defendant or other party to proceedings in which the order
is granted who have property within England and Wales; (2) persons who are
subject to the jurisdiction of the English court, have been given notice of the
order, and are able to prevent breaches of the order outside of England and
Wales; and (3) other persons, for instance, foreign nationals or institutions
not subject to the jurisdiction of the English court, or persons who are subject
to the jurisdiction of the English court but have not been notified. In the first
group, the Mareva would apply to all activities and property belonging to the

79. Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. at 215; Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 33; Derby No. 1, [1990]
1 Ch. at 55.
80. Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. at 217; Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 29; Derby & Co. Ltd. v.
Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] 1 Ch. 65, 84 (C.A. 1988).
81. Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 28; COLMAN & LYONS, supra note 43, at 106.
82. COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, at 106.
83. Derby Nos. 3 & 4, [1990] 1 Ch. at 84.
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defendant within England and Wales. In the second group, the courts have
ruled that, so long as the defendant is a proper party to the proceedings
brought in England and Wales, the English court has jurisdiction to order the
defendant to do anything outside England and Wales that the court would be
able to order him to do inside England and Wales. The jurisdiction is
essentially in personam and not in rem.84 The English courts therefore have
jurisdiction to issue a worldwide Mareva to order a defendant who has been
properly joined as a defendant to transfer assets from one foreign jurisdiction
to another, if this will prevent the defendant from taking action that would
render any future judgment or award of the court unsatisfied.85 This
discretion, however, should be exercised with great care. Accordingly, the
first issue will be whether a party is properly joined to proceedings in
England. This depends on the Rules of Court and whether the court can
obtain personal jurisdiction over someone who is outside of the territorial
jurisdiction.
In the third group, defendants who are foreign nationals and not subject
to the jurisdiction of the English courts are not bound to obey the order
unless or until there is an order of the foreign court which has jurisdiction
over them. Even then, they are bound only to the extent of the order of the
foreign court. Essentially, once the plaintiff obtains the English Mareva, it
must then apply to the foreign court to have the Mareva recognized and
enforced against the foreign defendant. The proviso makes clear that the
English court does not claim jurisdiction. So the plaintiff will need to make
a further application in the foreign jurisdiction where it believes the
defendant's assets are located. Plaintiff will need to consider whether the
country has a procedure equivalent to the Mareva jurisdiction, and whether
it is likely to exercise it in support of the order of the English court. But
before application can be made in the foreign court, leave must be granted
by the English court.
2.

Requirements for Worldwide Mareva

The court has jurisdiction to grant a worldwide Mareva in support of
proceedings brought in England, both before and after judgment. All such
orders must contain a Babanaft provisio. In addition, the following
requirements are common to prejudgment and postjudgment applications: the
plaintiff must have a good arguable case on the merits and must show that
there are insufficient assets in England to meet judgment, that the defendant
has foreign assets, and that there is a real risk of disposal of assets so as to

84. Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 6), [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139, 1149 (C.A.).
85. Id.
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frustrate enforcement of the plaintiff's judgment if one is obtained.86 Even
then, the court will rarely issue a worldwide Mareva, but as Lord Justice
Kerr said in a famous passage that has been cited in other cases: "[S]ome
situations ... cry out - as a matter of justice to the plaintiffs - for
disclosure orders and Mareva type87 injunctions covering foreign assets of
defendants even before judgment.,
The types of cases that "cry out" for justice are large claim cases in
which the defendant's conduct has been most egregious and underhanded in
trying to frustrate the legitimate claims of plaintiffs in English courts. A case
h Government of Haiti had a claim
in point is Duvalier, 88~in which the
against former President Duvalier and his family for US$120 million for
embezzlement. 89 This was a good case for a Mareva injunction because the
defendants had admitted that they had been moving their assets around the
world in an attempt to evade the efforts of the plaintiff to freeze them.9°
Lord Justice Staughton stated: "[I]f ever there was a case for the exercise of
the court's powers, this must be it." 91 Moreover, in Derby No. 1, the claim
was for £25 million.92 The defendants included a Panamanian and a
Luxembourg company. 93 The trial judge had found that the plaintiffs had
a" 'highly arguable' "case, and that there was a high risk that the defendants
would dissipate their assets, as they were " 'well used to moving funds
worldwide.' "9 In summary, the worldwide Mareva appears to be appropriate only where large sums are involved and where there is evidence
that the defendants are adept at moving assets around the world through
sophisticated means so that enforcement of the judgment or orders would
cause considerable difficulty.
IV.

THE ANTON PILLER ORDER: BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

In some cases it is vital for a plaintiff to ensure that the defendant does
not destroy or dispose of evidence in the defendant's possession so as to
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to prove its case.95 In
this situation, the Anton Pillerorder permits the plaintiff to demand entry to
the defendant's premises (business or residential) in order to inspect and

86. Derby No. 1, [1990] 1 Ch. at 48.
87. Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 33; see Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. at 217 (Lord Justice
Staughton quoting Justice Kerr in Babanaft, [1990] 1 Ch. at 33).
88. Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. at 202.
89. Id. at 204.
90. Id. at 217.
91. Id.
92. Derby No. 1, [1990] 1 Ch. at 51.
93. Id. at 50.
94. Id. at 54 (quoting Judge Mervyn Davis) (citation omitted).
95. Anton Piller, [1976] 1 Ch. at 61-62.
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photograph documents and chattels on the premises, and to remove
documents or other items for a short time if such items might form evidence
in the action, or proposed action, against the defendant. Generally, the order
will provide that it must be served by an independent solicitor in the presence
of the plaintiff's solicitor.96 The plaintiff's solicitor then executes the order,
supervised by the independent solicitor.97 In some situations, the order may
provide for service and execution by the plaintiff's own solicitor without
supervision. The Anton Piller order must be clear and concise, and it must
be based on full disclosure to the court.98 The court's power to issue the
order derives from its inherent jurisdiction to prevent a defendant from
frustrating judgment, for instance by destroying or disposing of either the
evidence or the subject matter of the dispute before the proceedings have
begun. The Anton Piller order often includes a direction to give details on
affidavit of assets and other premises, or to deliver up goods, and is often
considered as a tool to be used ancillary to a Mareva injunction.
The whole concept of the Anton Piller order is very controversial - an
anathema to most jurists. In Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes
99
Ltd.,
Lord Denning clearly set forth this view:
Let me state at once that no court in this land has any power to
issue a search warrant to enter a man's house so as to see if there are
papers or documents there which are of an incriminating nature,
whether libels or infringements of copyright or anything else of the
kind. No constable or bailiff can knock at the door and demand
entry so as to inspect papers or documents. The householder can
shut the door in his face and say "Get out."'"
Lord Denning argued, however, that the order was only to be undertaken
with the defendant's permission and was justifiable under certain circumstances. He stated:
It seems to me that such an order can be made by a judge ex parte,
but it should only be made where it is essential that the plaintiff
should have inspection so that justice can be done between the
parties: and when, if the defendant were forewarned, there is a grave
danger that vital evidence will be destroyed, that papers will be burnt
or lost or hidden, or taken beyond the jurisdiction, and so the ends

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See 1994 Practice Direction, [1994] 1 W.L.R. at 1233 § 3(b)(1)(a).
Id.
COLMAN & LYON, supra note 41, app. B, at 205, 207.
Anton Piller, [1976] 1 Ch. at 55.
Id. at 60.
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of justice be defeated: and when the inspection would do no real
harm to the defendant or his case.' 0'
There are three essential preconditions for this order: (1) plaintiff must
demonstrate an "extremely strong" prima facie case; (2) the potential or
actual damage to the applicant must be "very serious," and (3) clear evidence
must exist that the defendants have incriminating documents or things in their
possession, and that there is a "real possibility" that the defendants may
destroy the material before an application inter partes can be made.1 1 2 The
overriding consideration in issuing this order is that "it is to be resorted to
only in circumstances where the normal processes of the law would be
if some immediate and effective measure was not
rendered nugatory
03
available."'
A.

Procedure

An Anton Piller order may be granted at any stage of litigation from the
period before the writ was issued until after judgment while in aid of
execution. It may be granted in all divisions of the High Court and in the
Court of Appeal. It may also be granted in the Patents County Court, but not
in any other county court. Cases within the jurisdiction of the county court
should be transferred to the High Court for such application. The order is
most often heard in the Chancery Division where requests for injunctions are
heard in open court. Therefore, a request for the court to review the
application in camera is essential to minimize publicity and maintain
complete surprise.'0 4
The order is not a "civil" search warrant. The only recourse a plaintiff
has if the defendant denies the Supervising Solicitor entry to the premises is
to apply to the court for a contempt order. Force cannot be used, and though
defendants risk being penalized for contempt, their desire to take legal advice
before permitting entry has been recognized as reasonable, and must be stated
in the standard order form. 15 The order cannot be used to discover
evidence on which to base a later claim,10 6 but it can probably extend to
overseas premises so long as the defendant is within the jurisdiction of the
English courts.10 7 However, this will not extend to Scotland based on
101.
102.
103.
104.
also be
(Fain.).
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Vapormatic Co. Ltd. v. Sparex Ltd., [1976] 1 W.L.R. 939, 940 (Ch.). Orders may
granted in the Family Division. See Emanuel v. Emanuel, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 669
Manor Elec. Ltd. et al. v. Dickson et al., [1988] R.P.C. 618 (Q.B. Div.).
Hytrac Conveyors Ltd. v. Conveyors Int'l Ltd., [1983] F.S.R. 63 (C.A. 1982).
Cook Indus. Inc. v. Galliher, [1979] 1 Ch. 439, 443 (1978).
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internal comity within the United Kingdom." 8
. The application for an Anton Piller order must include an undertaking to
the court by the solicitors that they will not use documents and goods seized
on the execution of the order for any purpose other than in the action in
which they were seized, without leave of court or consent of the party from
whom they were taken.' 9 If solicitors negligently fails to provide accurate
information to the court based on their undertakings, the court may issue a
contempt order against them. " °
B.

Tactics

The successful execution of an Anton Piller order depends on good
planning and logistical tactics. Many firms of solicitors employ extra staff
or consultants to handle the logistics of enforcement, which include having
adequate numbers of people on or near the site over and above those
permitted to enter the premises. It is especially necessary to watch all exits
and check if observation can be kept on rooms where shredding machines or
other disposal units are kept.
Staff may want to have hand-held
tape-recorders, video cameras, and light cameras.
If more than one address is within the order, it is important that staff and
consultants coordinate their execution of the order. For example, if
defendants work from or have control of other addresses, a watch must be
kept on them to see if service of the order at the main address causes a
reaction elsewhere. If the defendants have something to conceal, they will
most likely have efficient means of alerting their colleagues; therefore,
plaintiff can prevent the loss of much important evidence by keeping a close
watch on the appropriate locations. Moreover, the courts disapprove of the
police being asked to stand by unless there is a real risk of a breach of the
peace. In such a case, the use of the police should only be made with leave
of court.
Plaintiffs must ensure that when serving Anton Pillerorders, they observe
the procedural requirements in the order. Before 1986, Anton Piller orders
were regularly being granted in all divisions of the High Court, and their
popularity was due primarily to their effectiveness in forcing defendants to
settle plaintiffs' claims once the defendants were served with these orders.
Needless to say, the broad scope of these orders was prone to abuse.
Abusive execution of an Anton Piller order was at issue in Columbia Picture

108. Altertext Inc. v. Advanced Data Communications Ltd., [1985] 1 W.L.R. 457,462 (Ch.
1984).
109. EMI Records Ltd. v. Spillane, [1986] 2 Ch. 1.
110. VDU Installations Ltd. v. Integrated Computer Sys. & Cybernetics Ltd., [1989] 1
F.S.R. 378 (Ch. 1988).
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Industries Inc. v. Robinson."' Because hundreds of Anton Piller cases
previously had been settled, Columbia provided Justice Scott with the2
opportunity to consider the development and operation of these orders."
He delivered a devastating critique, observing that one of the immediate
effects of an Anton Piller order was to close down defendant's business." 3
He also queried:
What is to be said of the Anton Piller procedure which, on a regular
and institutionalised basis, is depriving citizens of their property and
closing down their businesses' by orders made ex parte, on applications of which they know nothing and at which they cannot be
heard, by orders which they are
forced, on pain of committal, to
4
obey, even if wrongly made?' "
Moreover, Justice Scott stated that "the practice of the court has allowed the
balance to swing much too far in favour of plaintiffs and that Anton Piller
orders have been too readily granted and with insufficient safeguards for
respondents."115
Until 1992, Anton Piller orders had been granted in a wide variety of
circumstances, but their use dramatically declined after UniversalThermosensors Ltd. v. Hibben.11 6 Universal Thermosensors was a very important case
because it was the first step by the courts in adopting an agreed upon,
uniform approach to Anton Pillerorders. This also made it easier to adopt
a uniform approach to Mareva injunctions and eventually, to standard form
injunctions. The Vice Chancellor's ruling in Universal Thermosensors is the
basis for the standard form for an Anton Piller order." 7 The standard form
shows a clear emphasis on the rights of the defendant by underlining the
original safeguards required when Anton Piller orders were first developed
and by providing additional safeguards, such as strict scrutiny of the evidence
produced by plaintiff; emphasis upon issuing less draconian orders which the
court may grant; further developments of the undertakings that the plaintiff
must give before an order is granted; new safeguards for the defendant in
execution of an order; and specific standards of when and to what extent the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's solicitors may be liable to the defendant for
nondisclosure at the ex parte application or errors in execution of the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

[1987] 1 Ch. 38, 39 (1985).
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 76.
[1992] 1 W.L.R. 840 (Ch.).

117. See id. at 860-61.
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order. 1 8 In particular, it appears that courts will approve of exemplary
damages against plaintiff or its solicitors for wrongful or oppressive
execution of the order." 9
C.

Scope

The scope of an Anton Piller order is as broad as a Mareva injunction
and involves many potential difficulties, not only because of consequent
interference with the rights of individuals and companies, but also because
of its effect on third parties. The Anton Piller order is a powerful tool for
preserving evidence and preventing empty judgments. There are three
(1) cases involving
principal areas of law where the order is used:
intellectual property rights, such as trade marks, copyrights patents, and trade
secrets, (2) cases involving industrial espionage or anticompetition claims
brought by ex-employers against ex-employees, and (3) matrimonial
proceedings where it is thought that a spouse has failed to make truthful
statements of his or her assets. There is a distinctive difference between the
practice in the first two types of cases and the third, namely, in intellectual
property and anticompetition cases, there is likely to be a preemptive strike
by the plaintiff in which the application is made before or atthe time the writ
is issued and before it is served. In matrimonial cases, the order is likely to
be made as a last resort, when other measures are considered not to have
resulted in truthful disclosure. Anton Pillerorders also may be used in other
types of cases, but recent cases have cast doubt on the use of Anton Piller
orders in cases involving criminal conduct because of the privilege against
20
self-incrimination. 1
V.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Because Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders are ordinarily
granted ex parte, the defendant has no opportunity to address the court and
object to the applicant's request for the order.' 2' To a lawyer in the United
States, this is striking because such an order issued by a U.S. court would
appear to violate basic principles of due process requiring notice and a
hearing before a defendant may be deprived of its property. An English
court's review of a party's ex parte request to freeze a potential defendant's
assets and to invade its property to search for evidence creates a substantial
risk that such an order will be issued without knowledge of arguments that

118. Moore, supra note 4, at 190-201 (presenting "Precedent for an Anton Piller Order").
119. Columbia, [1987] 1 Ch. at 87.
120. See Lord Justice Scott et al., Anton Piller Orders - A Consultation Paper (Lord
Chancellor's Dep't, Nov. 1992).
121. 1994 PracticeDirection, [1994] 1 W.L.R. at 1233.
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might be properly made on behalf of the defendant. To protect against this,
the plaintiff must provide certain information and guarantees as part of
making an ex parte application, which includes the following: (1) full and
frank disclosure of any points which the defendant might raise if he were
present to oppose the application; (2) indemnification of the defendant in
compensation for damages if the order later proves to be without merit; and
(3) serving the evidence on the defendant as soon as practicable and notifying
the defendant of the right to apply to have the order discharged. As will be
shown, Mareva injunctions must contain provisions that protect the security
interests of banks and their right to setoff. Similar undertakings must be
made by plaintiff's solicitors in executing an Anton Piller order, including
returning originals of all documents obtained as a result of the order within
two days of seizure.
Today, both orders remain extremely useful weapons in a claimant's legal
arsenal. For instance, a company that suspects a competitor has misappropriated confidential trade secrets may obtain and execute an Anton Piller
order to search the premises of the competitor and obtain any documents
relevant to the demand in the order. While the Anton Piller order is being
executed, the plaintiff also may obtain a Mareva injunction to temporarily
freezes the assets of the defendant while the search of the defendant's
premises and the copying of all relevant documents is being conducted. One
of the likely effects of the Anton Piller order is to close down the business
of the defendant, which, based on the applicant's evidence, operates in
violation of the plaintiff's rights. The use of the Anton Piller order may
effectively deprive citizens of their property and terminate their business
operations through orders that were obtained ex parte based on applications
against which the defendants were not permitted to be heard and which they
must obey.
In recent cases involving Anton Piller orders, courts have been more
vigilant in ensuring that procedural safeguards are maintained for defendants
by enforcing a strict interpretation of the requirements placed on the
plaintiff.'22 For example, in Universal Thermosensors, the court addressed
serious irregularities in the execution of orders by the plaintiff's solicitors by
requiring adherence to a new set of guidelines when serving Anton Piller
orders. 23 Before Universal Thermosensors, English courts were reluctant
to impose damages against the plaintiffs or their solicitors when failing to
observe procedural safeguards to protect the defendant. In Universal
Thermosensors, the plaintiff's solicitors obtained ex parte orders against the

122. Lock, [1989] 1 W.L.R. at 1280 (citing Booker McConnell Plc. v. Plascow, [1985]
R.P.C. 425).
123. Universal Thermosensors, [1992] 1 W.L.R. at 860-61.
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defendant's business property without revealing to the court certain material
evidence which, if known to the court, might have dissuaded it from issuing
the order. 2 4 The plaintiff's solicitors were held to have acted so egregiously that the court ordered them to pay £20,000 in damages as compensation
to the defendants.125 The Universal Thermosensors case reflects the
tendency of courts to scrutinize more thoroughly applications for Anton Piller
orders.
Unlike Anton Piller orders, the recent cases on Mareva injunctions have
not been so concerned with protecting the defendant's rights. Instead, these
cases emphasize a broadened scope of application of freeze orders, such as
the worldwide Mareva, against assets that are located not only within the
United Kingdom but also in foreign jurisdictions. In some circumstances, the
courts will also permit plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil in order to
prevent individuals from escaping the effect of Mareva injunctions by the use
of companies that they wholly control. Notwithstanding the broadened scope
and power of Mareva injunctions in recent case law, courts have developed
certain protections for defendants, namely, the imposition of damages against
plaintiffs for failing to disclose all material information related to the strength
of their claim and for not disclosing evidence that would have shown the
defendant to be no threat to the dissipation or transfer of the assets sought by
the plaintiffs.
VI.

THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENT ACT 1982

The harmonization of the procedures of the European Economic
Community (EEC), the convention on the jurisdiction of courts, and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases were
agreed to by the Member States of the European Community in 1968 and
went into force in 1973.126 The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland
signed an accession agreement to cover their new membership in 1978. '27
The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 enacted by the British
Parliament provided clear legal guidelines for Member States to adopt the
necessary procedural rules so that orders and judgments of courts of the
European Community could be recognized in the United Kingdom. 28 For
124. Id. at 842, 859.
125. Id. at 858.
STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 282-86 (1993).
127. The Convention on the Accession to the 1968 Convention and the 1971 Protocol of
Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, signed at Luxembourg, Oct. 9,
1978 [Accession Convention].
128. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, 52 STATUTES 381 (Eng.). This discussion
can only be brief regarding Mareva and Anton Piller orders. For a full analysis of the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which gave the 1968 Brussels Convention the force of
law, and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991, which gave the 1988 Lugano

126.
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purposes of this article, the broadest and most far-reaching provisions allow
protective measures to be taken by any person of a contracting country even
if proceedings have already begun in another Contracting State. Article 24
of the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction sets out the basis of this
power: "Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for
such provisional measures, including protective measures, as may be
available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the
courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of
' 29
the matter."'
In addition, section 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
clarifies the position as to interim relief pending the trial or appeal and
allows English court jurisdiction to grant relief even if the subject matter of
the continuing proceedings is a question of jurisdiction, or is a reference to
the European Court under the 1971 Protocol to the 1968 Convention. 3 '
Section 25 reverses the effect of the Siskina case where the Privy Council
had decided that a plaintiff could not obtain a Mareva injunction from an
English court against a defendant's property in England when the plaintiff
had brought the action in a foreign jurisdiction and the legal or equitable
right on which the Mareva injunction was based arose under foreign law."'
At present, with the standard provisions of the Act now in force, a plaintiff
suing, for example, in France, can apply to the English courts to freeze the
defendant's assets in England, provided the Convention applies to the original
claim. 32 Once a foreign judgment has been given in France, the party can
enforce the judgment debt against defendant's assets in England under the
recognition and enforcement procedures of the Convention.' 33 Therefore,
there is now complete interaction between the Member States of the EEC on
the principle that a party's assets may be frozen in one way or another
pending the outcome of a trial.
VII.

EMERGENCY PRETRIAL RELIEF UNDER UNITED STATES LAW

United States law has traditionally provided an array of prejudgment
security mechanisms that are available to creditors to restrain debtors from
dissipating or disposing of property that would otherwise be available to
Convention the force of law, see the Jenard Report, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1, 66; the Schlosser
Report, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 71; see also LAWRENCE COLLINS, THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS ACT 1982 (1992).
129. The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, signed at Brussels, Sept. 27, 1968 [hereinafter 1968 Convention].
130. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, supra note 128, pt. 4, § 25.
131. Siskina, [1979] A.C. 210; COLLINS, supra note 128, at 6.

132. 1968 Convention, supra note 129, arts. 1-3.
133. Section 4, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, supra note 128, pt. 1, § 4; see
1968 Convention, supra note 129, art. 31(2).
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satisfy a judgment.1 34 In particular, the attachment procedure is available
in a situation where a defendant is likely to avoid payment of the debt if
judgment is secured. 135 Most state laws will allow an attachment to issue
if the defendant is a nonresident, has been absent from the jurisdiction for a
long period, has attempted to avoid being served with a summons, is on the
verge of removing or has already removed property from the state, or has
136
sold or transferred property with intent to avoid payment to creditors.
For a creditor to enforce its rights, most states require that certain procedures
be followed: for example, in addition to serving a defendant with a summons
and a copy of the complaint, the creditor also may obtain security before a
debt matures if it appears probable that the debtor is attempting to defraud
creditors. 37 Moreover, most state courts have the equitable power to issue
ex parte orders in favor of a creditor without notice to the debtor if it is
likely that the creditor would suffer irreparable injury if "the order were
delayed."'' 38 As a general matter, however, these pre-suit and prejudgment
remedies must be pursued in compliance with the requirements of the U.S.
Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments so that debtor's property
39
rights are protected with due process of law during these procedures.
The constitutional requirements primarily include adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a timely manner on the merits of the creditors
claim. '40
In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish the procedure

134. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 96-184 (1991).
135. A good sample of U.S. prejudgment attachment statutes are: CAL. CIV. PROC.
§§ 481.0101-493.060 (1997); FLA. STAT. §§ 76.01-.32 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 425.301.316 (1997); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES §§ 6201-6226 (1997); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §§ 61.021-.023 (1997). Attachment also may be used as security for litigation pending

outside the state where assets are located. Barclay's Bank, S.A. v. Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802
(D.C. App. 1988). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act also contains a procedure whereby
the U.S. government can obtain prejudgment remedies to secure a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692
(1994).
136. Ky. REV. STAT. § 425.301(1)(a)-(h); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 61.002.
137. FLA. Stat. § 76.05.
138. KY. REV. STAT. § 425.308. The creditor is required to post a bond the value of which
must be twice the amount of the claim. Id. § 425.309. The debtor may dissolve the
attachment and regain control of the property if the debtor posts a bond equal to the creditor's
claim, including court costs and attorney's fees. Id.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 76.08, .12.
139. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV. The Fourteenth amendment provides that states may
not deprive persons of property without due process of law. Id. amend. XIV. The Supreme
Court has interpreted what "process is due" and has outlined certain requirements with which
state prejudgment attachment statutes must conform. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1
(1991); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
140. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

25

LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL Law,
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1997],
Art. 8

[Vol. I11

for securing preliminary injunctive relief in civil actions.' 4' The purpose of
the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo between parties
pending a final determination on the merits. 142 A federal court is vested
with full authority to determine whether to grant the injunction and to
determine its scope.' 43

As part of its broad authority to issue injunctive

relief, Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes U.S.
district courts to issue temporary restraining orders to freeze assets when
those assets are the subject matter in dispute. 44 More recently, the Second
Circuit has ruled that Rule 65 also authorizes a district court to issue a
temporary restraining order "to protect [a] plaintiff's right to recover
monetary damages when there is a threat of defendant's insolvency or its
dissipation of assets," and the assets in questions are "not directly involved
in the pending litigation."'' 45 The use of a temporary restraining order in
this context is similar to the use of a Mareva injunction to freeze assets either
before trial or before a writ is issued. Unlike the Mareva injunction, the
temporary restraining order is ordinarily issued only after both notice is given
to the party whose property would be deprived by such order and an
adversarial hearing. The application for a Mareva injunction typically
involves no notice to the opposing party and is issued by the court on an ex
parte basis.
However, there is no counterpart in U.S. civil procedure to the Anton
Pillerorder. The nearest equivalent of an Anton Pillerorder under U.S. law
is the use of a criminal warrant issued by a judge on ex parte basis so that
law enforcement authorities may seize important evidence before it is
destroyed. United States law has no counterpart to the Anton Piller order in
civil actions most probably because the enforcement of such orders in the
United States would infringe the defendant's due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The use of the temporary restraining order to freeze the assets of a
defendant who is at risk of dissipating or transferring assets out of jurisdiction, even when those assets are not the subject matter of the dispute, is a
significant change in the equity jurisprudence of the federal courts and has
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
142. Arthur Guinness & Sons, PLC. v. Sterling Publ'g Co., 732 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.
1984).
143. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). In this case, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated: "An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on district courts is an appeal to
the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity." Id.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1986).
145. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, 143 F.3d 688, 693-95
(2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, on occasion, a party will rely on Federal Rule 65 not only to freeze
financial assets but also to obtain an order preventing another from continuing a course of
conduct that either violates the rights of others or has that potential.
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its origins in past U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 14 6 the plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the defendant from

disposing of any assets pending the outcome of their damage action for
fraudulent misrepresentation. 47 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
"[wa]s insolvent and threatened with many lawsuits, that its business [wa]s
virtually at a standstill because of unfavorable publicity, that preferences to
creditors [we]re probable, and that its assets [we]re in danger of dissipation
and depletion."' 4 8 The Court held:
[T]he injunction was a reasonable measure to preserve the status quo
pending final determination of the questions raised by the bill....
As already stated, there were allegations that [defendant] was
insolvent and its assets in danger of dissipation or depletion. This
[defendant], without recourse to
being so, the legal remedy against 49
the fund

. . .

would be inadequate.

In a more recent case, the Supreme Court upheld a preliminary injunction
freezing assets in order to assure the enforceability of an eventual money
judgment. 150 These two Supreme Court cases support a district court's
exercise of general equitable power to ensure the preservation of an adequate
remedy. 5 ' Today, equity jurisprudence supports the use of a preliminary
injunction to protect a plaintiff's right to recover monetary damages when
there is a threat that the defendant will become insolvent or dissipate
152

assets.

The equitable nature of the remedy and its intent to prevent an alleged
irreparable harm from occurring justify a court's use of broad powers under
the temporary restraining order. The same standards that apply for a
preliminary injunction also apply in the temporary restraining order context.

146. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
147. Id. at 285.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 290.

150. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1965). In First Nat'l
City Bank, the U.S. government sought payment of back taxes. Id. at 379. The Court stated

that "[o]nce personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to
order the party to 'freeze' property under its control." Id. at 384.
151. See United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Singer Co., 889 F.2d 1327, 1330
(4th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
152. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
a preliminary injunction is authorized in "extraordinary circumstances" in a suit seeking only
money damages, such as when there is a possibility that the defendant will be insolvent at the
time of judgment); see also Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 52-53 (1st Cir.
1986) (holding that it lay within the district court's power to enjoin the defendant from
disposing of assets when there is a danger that the defendant will become insolvent prior to
judgment).
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The requirements are: (1) the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable injury to plaintiff if no injunction is
issued; (3) the degree of harm that an injunction would cause to the
defendant; and (4) the public interest."' A wide range of conduct may be
subject to a temporary restraining order including: (1) the defendant's
violation of a trademark by marketing protected goods, (2) the defendant's
marketing of goods in a geographic area or under circumstances which
violate an exclusive right in the claimant, or (3) the defendant's violation of
a covenant not to compete agreement in the employment context. 54
The use of temporary restraining orders is similar to the Mareva
injunction and has been approved by most U.S. federal circuits. 155 In
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, the Second Circuit upheld a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the family of former Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos from encumbering real property located in New York that allegedly56
had been purchased with funds embezzled from the Philippines.1
Moreover, in a related case, the Ninth Circuit Court upheld a California
federal court that had issued a temporary restraining order that would apply
extraterritorially against the Marcoses personally to prevent them from
transferring assets
wherever located, including their assets in banks in foreign
57
jurisdictions.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders have become popular and
effect tools for creditors in England and Wales to preserve the financial
assets of questionable debtors while a legal action is pending. The use of
these emergency interlocutory orders has strengthened the appeal of English
courts as forums to resolve international commercial disputes. Moreover,
since 1990 the national legal systems of the European Union have recognized
the application of Mareva injunctions and Anton Pillerorders with the result

153. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1) (preliminary injunctions), 65(b) (temporary restraining
orders), cited in FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES, RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 210 (1996); see also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (holding that a
temporary restraining order be issued in an employment dispute); Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar
Enter., Inc., 112 F.3d 689 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an injunction against Russian exporter
of "grey market" goods be issued); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano,
999 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a temporary restraining order be issued in an
employment dispute at securities firm).
154. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.16 (1994).

155. See Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 197; Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 760 F.2d 1300,

1309 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
156. 806 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit issued the injunction to
provide assistance to the Philippine government in its attempt to recover funds wrongfully
taken during Marcos's reign of power. Id. at 350-52.
157. In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss3/8

28

ORDER
PILLER
ANTON
INJUNCTION
MAREVAInjunction
THEMareva
19971 Alexander: The
andAND
Anton
Piller
Order:
The Nuclear

515
Weapons

that these orders have become effective weapons for creditors to enforce their
rights throughout the European Community. Although courts in recent years
have been more willing to issue Mareva injunctions, they have become more
vigilant and circumspect in reviewing the use of Anton Piller orders.
Although the liability risks of using Anton Piller orders have increased
significantly in recent years, many litigants are finding the use of both orders
in tandem to be a particularly effective way of minimizing risk when
pursuing a claim against a risky debtor. The Mareva and Anton Pillerorders
are valuable pretrial tactics for the litigant and will continue to be utilized in
all divisions of the English High Court. Moreover, the international scope
of such orders will become more pronounced in the future as more and more
international transactions involve debtors seeking to transfer their property
and assets to different jurisdictions to avoid creditor claims.
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